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Abstract
Existing communication protocols in security networks are highly centralized. While
this naively makes the controls easier to physically secure, external actors require
fewer resources to disrupt the system because there are fewer points in the system
can be interrupted without the entire system failing. We present a solution to this
problem using a proof-of-work-based blockchain implementation built on MultiChain.
We construct a test-bed network containing visual imagers and microwave sensor
information. These data types are ubiquitous in perimeter security systems and
allow a realistic representation of a real-world network architecture. The cameras in
this system use an object detection algorithm to find important targets in the scene.
The raw data from both the sensors and imagers are placed in a transaction. These
transactions are then bundled into blocks and broadcast to the rest of the network
using the Bitcoin-based MultiChain protocol. We develop five tests to examine
the security metrics of our network. We performed the five security metric test

vi
using different sized networks from 7 to 39 nodes to determine how the metrics scale
with respect to size. We find that when compared to a centralized architecture our
implementation provides a resiliency increase that is expected from a blockchainbased protocol without slowing the system so much that a human operator would
notice. Furthermore, our approach is able to detect tampering in real time. Based on
these results, we theorize that security networks in general could use a blockchainbased approach in a meaningful way.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Blockchains are often thought to be synonymous with cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. However, the applications for blockchains are much larger than
implementing currencies and other financial applications. Many companies are currently using private blockchains for tracking their supply chains in a more accurate
and secure manner [1]. Others are using blockchain to track the movements of employees in secure areas [1]. These use cases point to broader applications of private
blockchains for increasing transparency, resiliency, and providing operational value
difficult to achieve via traditional means. In this analysis, we evaluate the feasibility
of a private blockchain communication network applied to physical security systems.
This work explores the application of set of private blockchains built using the
MultiChain protocol to collect and distribute data in a security system. In current
physical security systems all digital data is collected at the edge and sent to a central
location requiring that the collection points and analyst of the data be trusted. As
more information generators are added at the edge of security systems it becomes
more difficult to trust every component. Blockchains offer a technological solution
that could change how we place trust in components, making it easier to work with
many sources of information while still being confident that the system is secure.
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With these added benefits blockchain technology is paving the way for more complex
security architectures.
MultiChain is a private blockchain built on the Bitcoin core using proof of work
consensus and round robin scheduler to ensure a diverse set of transactions and
blocks [2]. We use MultiChain to create a decentralized network of cameras and
sensors that are capable of communicating data with increased resiliency and prioritization to the human in the loop of the security system. For example an operator
would be presented with two data streams for camera data; one with objects in the
scene detected by You Only Look Once (YOLO), a machine learning algorithm and
one without. The operator can therefore put more focus on the images with an object
detected in them.
This approach for data communication uses smart filters, admin nodes, and member nodes on multiple blockchains that are loosely connected with each other. MultiChain implements smart filters which check if transactions meet certain criteria
before adding them to the block. These smart filters can facilitate novel things like
segmentation of the network based on data type without causing a large overlap of
different data types. They also allow the system to perform checks on aspects of a
transaction autonomously without human involvement, adding additional resiliency
without human interaction with the system. The admin nodes add permissions to
the network as well as make and approve changes to smart filters to control the network through the admin consensus mechanism. The member nodes act as validators
for the system as well as being the nodes where data is generated and added to the
system. Both of these nodes are important; admin nodes control the structure of the
system and member nodes add more bulk which we hypothesize will add resiliency.
This allows us to strategically design the distributed network where nodes with less
privileges can be on the edge of the system while admin nodes are in more secure
locations.
We measure the security and resiliency of the network using five security metric
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tests: a Admin Resiliency Test, Member Resiliency Test, Tamper Detection Test,
Speed of Transaction Test, Bandwidth Comparison Test, ending with a Scalability
Analysis. The Admin and Member Resiliency Tests determine whether the network
could continue working if some nodes were taken offline. When admin nodes are
taken offline we specifically test if admin functionality such as adding smart filters
remains, and when member nodes are taken offline we test if the network is still able
to send security data via transactions to the blockchain. This was accomplished by
turning off nodes systematically and testing how the network performed based on the
above criteria. The Tamper Detection Test used the tamper value on transactions
(indicating that a camera was moved or something else about the node was changed)
and sent transactions flagged as tampered to the network. We then measured if
the network saw the fraudulent transaction. The Speed of Transaction test measured the time it took to send a single transaction on the blockchain network. The
Bandwidth Comparison Test measured the time it took to send multiple transactions
through both the blockchain network and measured the amount of time it took for
all transactions in the set to be added. For the scalability analysis we evaluated all of
these metrics using different network sizes to determine how each performance metric
scaled with respect to size. After extensive testing in a variety of configurations, we
found our network architecture is able to remain online even when multiple nodes
are shut down.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows:

• Chapter 2 Evaluates other academic blockchain based approaches in different
fields, discuss the background of security systems and the MultiChain protocol.
• Chapter 3 describes the architecture of our test network. We discuss other
blockchain architectures and motivate our use of MultiChain.
• Chapter 4 discusses the six resiliency and robustness tests of our system.
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• Chapter 5 presents the experimental results. We find that our network is
relatively resilient to attack, especially in contrast to a centralized system.
• Chapter 6 We conclude with a discussion on future work in Chapter 6 where we
deal with the real world implications of our model and look toward additional
testing and comparisons. We find that our approach can be broadly applied to
topics outside of the specific application shown in this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background

While blockchain technology has been the technological backbone of cryptocurrencies
since 2009 [3]. The technologies that supported the creation of blockchain have
existed far longer. One of the foundations of blockchain is public key cryptography
created in 1976 [4]. Another important technology to the modern blockchain is the
proof-of-work consensus mechanism which was introduced in Hash Cash in 1997 [5].
After the release of Bitcoin [3] many blockchains were created such as Ethereum [6],
Litecoin [7], Polkadot [8], etc.
Each type of blockchain utilizes different permissions and technologies to come
to consensus. Public permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin allow anyone to read
the blockchain and write data to the blockchain. Public permissioned blockchains
allows anyone to read data on the blockchain but participants must meet some sort
of criteria to write data to the blockchain. Private permissionless blockchains allow
anyone to write their own data but only nodes given permissions by other nodes
will be able to read data on a private permissionless blockchain. Lastly private
permissioned blockchains participants must be added by nodes that are currently
on the network to view the blockchain and be given permission to write data to the
blockchain. While these blockchains differ in who can participate in the network each
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are still able to reach consensus. These different blockchains will usually use different
types of consensus mechanisms such as lottery based consensus (e.g. proof-of-work,
proof-of-stake) or voting based consensus (e.g. practical byzantine fault tolerance,
delegated byzantine fault tolerance) to reach consensus and a common feature of
blockchains is to have an immutable ledger of transactions which cannot be altered.
Blockchain also is generally tied to resiliency to node fault in a system so nodes can
go offline or behave with a byzantine fault and it will not affect the performance of
the system.

2.1

Applications of Blockchain Technology

With the development of different types of blockchains the application space has
expanded past cryptocurrency into a multitude of domains which can benefit from
the immutable features of blockchain technology. Applications currently being researched include supply chain management[9], immutable audit logs[10], production
systems[11], as well as many others [1]. Each type of application can give us interesting insights as to proper use cases for blockchain in a system.
However, one major problem with the rise of blockchain applications is that often a blockchain simply is not needed for the use case detailed by designers. Wüst
and Gervais created a model to decide if a blockchain is necessary for different applications [12]. The model is built upon characteristics of the different types of
blockchains currently utilized for applications and characterizes the needs that each
type of blockchain could support. The main questions they suggest asking before
using a blockchain are:

• Does state need to be stored?
• Are there multiple writers in the system?
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• Can online Trusted Third Party always be used?
• Are all writers known and are they trusted?

Based on this framework, we will provide an overview of current research on applying
blockchains to different cyberphysical systems and discuss how this problem fits the
criteria.
The application MedRec [13] uses an Ethereum blockchain to communicate data
ownership and viewership of medical records. The system uses regular databases to
store the data off chain. The writers of the blockchain do not necessarily need to
be trusted for the blockchain half of the system, but do need to be trusted for the
regular DB half (where the medical records are stored). With this need to trust
writers based on the framework we are following from Wüst and Gervais suggests
that MedRec should use a private permissioned blockchain.
Sikorski et al. [14] created a MultiChain blockchain to create a peer-to-peer electricity market. This market application uses existing architectures to make a crosscountry currency to exchange electricity. This application did have the correct needs
to use a blockchain as there were multiple untrusted actors where the state needed
to be saved, it would be difficult to use a trusted third party for this application as
there are multiple parties that would have difficulty communicating through a third
party.
Zakhary et al. [15] propose a system that employs numerous permissionless blockchains and a permissioned blockchain to facilitate global asset management. The
permissionless blockchain part of the system would be suitable to use a blockchain
as the writers are not known or trusted, there are multiple writers, and state needs to
be stored. The permissioned portion of this system, however, does not necessitate a
blockchain because the permissioned blockchain is supposed to have trusted writers.
Saberi et al. [9] discuss how blockchain could affect supply chain management.
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The authors do not discuss a specific application of blockchain, rather, they specify
why a blockchain could be utilized. Based on the needs of the supply chain detailed
in their paper, a blockchain would be appropriately used. This is because their
system has multiple writers communicating internationally that cannot be trusted.
The system also needs to have a true record of what occurred as the item moved
through the chain.
Zyskind et al. [16] propose a system to manage personal privacy using blockchain.
This application used a blockchain appropriately as it needed to store state and there
were multiple writers that were known but not all of which could be trusted.
Karafiloski [17] discusses many applications of blockchain to big data problems
The paper discusses proponents for each type of blockchain and why one would
utilize them for a big data application. The first type of application discussed is
decentralized protection of personal data, one solution to this problem discussed is
the Zyskind paper discussed earlier in this section. Another application discussed
in the decentralized protection of personal data is an application called Ushare, this
application uses blockchain to track transactions but uses a distributed hash table
to store the actual data. This is used because the space and time constraints on this
system means that a blockchain is not capable of storing all of the information. This
application removes the necessity of trusting a third party with your data in a social
networking situation as the user could evaluate the hashes and see where exactly a
post goes by following the transaction log in the blockchain.
A second topic of discussion in Karafiloski’s review [17] is blockchain applied to
the area of digital property. One project the author discusses is Ascribe, the goal
of Ascribe is to allow for artists online to be able to track their artwork throughout
the internet so that they can be properly compensated. Ascribe created its own
protocol called SPOOL, it was made specifically for documenting transactions about
ownership of digital property. Ascribe allows an artist to more easily track their work
using SPOOL as can any other party who knows the hash since this application uses
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a public blockchain implementation.
Our interest in blockchain applications arises from the following problem: current
security systems are highly centralized and are not resilient to single points of failure,
we want to evaluate if a blockchain based approach could increase resiliency without
decreasing performance in a physical security system. Based on past work and Wüst
and Gervais’ [12] model for needing a blockchain, this work needs to ask do we
need a blockchain? We know that a physical security system needs to store state
to keep a log of past events, our particular type of security system cannot use an
always online trusted third party as the data cannot leave the local system, there
are multiple writers (i.e. sensors, imagers, human in the loop) which are all known
and can be added to the blockchain by a known entity but cannot necessarily be
trusted because of the possibility of malfunction for the imagers and sensors. With
this information about our system we know that a blockchain could be useful for
our needs. Based on Wüst and Gervais’ [12] model the particular type of blockchain
we should investigate is a private permissioned blockchain. Since this system could
benefit from a blockchain, it is valuable to test if the blockchain architecture can
support a security system and to determine how the blockchain architecture scales
with respect to size in the metrics important to physical security systems.

2.2

Background of MultiChain

MultiChain is a private blockchain architecture based on the Bitcoin core version 0.10
and MultiChain 1.0 was created in 2016 [2]. This blockchain extends the Bitcoin core
and so has integration with the Bitcoin core APIs. MultiChain is written in C++ and
can be run on x86 64 architectures. The source code was a fork of the source code
of Bitcoin. MultiChain developers integrated updates to the Bitcoin core which are
necessary for private blockchain development. These updates include the creation of
two types of nodes (admin and member) with different capabilities shown in Figure
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Admin Actions

Create new filters
Issue assets
Approve new filters
Approve new nodes

Member
Actions
Send transactions
Connect to blockchain
Receive transactions

Figure 2.1: Permissions of different nodes in MultiChain

2.1, adding a round robin schedule to the proof-of-work consensus algorithm, enabling
multiple blockchains to be configured at once on the same network, setting targets
for the time it takes to mine a block, and other actions.
To support a private network with two types of nodes, this implementation extends the cryptographic handshake used in Bitcoin to ensure that only permitted
nodes are able to make peer-to-peer connections. Each node will share their public
address that is on the permitted list; each node will verify all other nodes addresses
on their version of the permitted list. Each node will then send a challenge message
to every other node in the network. After the challenge message is sent each node
will send back a signature of the challenge message showing they own the private
key which corresponds to the public address. If at any of these steps a node fails,
the peer-to-peer (p2p) connection will be terminated. This allows the network to be
used or viewed by only contain nodes that are known to at least one administrator
while keeping nodes mostly unknown without allowing an arbitrary node onto the
network.

Chapter 2. Background

11

MultiChain uses a proof-of-work consensus like Bitcoin to regulate and randomize
the nodes rate of block production but enforces a round robin schedule to promote
mining diversity so that one miner cannot monopolize the mining process. This is
important in private blockchains because there are not as many participants (nodes
or miners) as found in public blockchains so it would be difficult to prevent a node
from taking over the network with more computing power without this addition. To
implement the round robin schedule MultiChain has a set of steps the blockchain
must take every time a block is mined first every permission change in the block must
be completed in order the related transactions show up in the block. Second, the
number of verified miners for this block is calculated. Third, the number of miners
is multiplied by the mining diversity factor that was set when the blockchain was
configured to calculate spacing. Lastly, we check if the miner of the current block
mined one of the previous spacing-1 blocks if so the block will not be mined. With
these rules for whether a block can be mined MultiChain prevents a miner from
mining every block if mining diversity is set above 0.
MultiChain also allows the institution to configure the target time for adding a
block. This means that institutions are not bound by the 10 minute average time
for Bitcoin to add a block to the blockchain and can set their targets much lower.
MultiChain allows an institution to create multiple private blockchains on the same
machines meaning that there can be data flowing through different blockchains on
the same network allowing nodes to pass data between different blockchains. This
is useful in the case of having two blockchains where an input occurring on the first
affects the behavior of the second, or if an institution wanted to store some data on
one blockchain and related data on another. MultiChain supports multiple tokens on
the same blockchain unlike the Bitcoin blockchain and many others. An institution
could use this function to only allow transactions on the blockchain that meet the
value requirement for multiple tokens through smart filters.
Smart filters are a way to add code to the blockchain which can be used to
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determine if a transaction is valid based on some criteria such as the amount of a
token or whether particular metadata is present in the transaction. For example a
smart filter could be created to ignore all transactions that did not have a certain
token’s value of 5 or more. Smart filters can be created and approved by admin
nodes which approve the smart filter through admin consensus. Smart filters can be
disapproved after use on the blockchain which is a key difference between smart filters
on MultiChain and Smart Contracts on Ethereum. This feature enables operators
and maintainers of the blockchain to disapprove smart filters if a bug is found, and
a new smart filter with a correction can be created and approved to take its place
on the blockchain.

2.3

Current Security Systems

As security systems are updated, more computing nodes and information generators
are added to the system in various places to enhance detection capabilities and are
generally added to a centralized communication architecture. In current physical
security systems this communication architecture takes data from these devices at
the edges of the system to a central location for processing. This presents problems
that impede the resiliency of a security system. This centralized design also requires
that we trust all of the components and humans in our system to behave in the expected manner. Since these challenges arise due to architectural choices themselves,
a current area of research for physical security systems is investigating distributed
communication architectures.
There are three major needs in a physical security system, that a distributed
architecture needs to support. These are fast agreement; a security system needs
to have data added to the event log quickly so that it can be assessed in a timely
manner. Tamper resistant; a security system needs to have data stored in such a
way that it cannot be easily altered by an adversary. Flexibility; a security system
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Data Protected

Confidentiality
Figure 2.2: CIA triangle

has multiple data formats that need to be stored in a way such that they are easily
accessible at the same time. The proposed system based on the MultiChain protocol
will support fast agreement with a short target time for mining blocks, tamper
resistant with the immutable storage that is inherent in blockchain technology, and
flexibility through the ability to add multiple tokens and metadata to the blockchain
and utilize multiple blockchains to store data.
Since we want to build a data communication architecture for a physical security
system it is important that we evaluate how a blockchain based system might perform in the three areas of the data protection triad shown in Figure 2.2. The first
element, integrity, is satisfied by the immutable ledger used in blockchain that does
not allow for unauthorized alteration. Blockchain technology provides confidentiality through encryption of the data on the blockchain and private/permissioned
blockchains require that a node be accepted by other nodes on the blockchain to
view or edit the information being added to the blockchain. Availability will be
supported by creating a more resilient system by distributing the data across the
system helping avoid issues such as denial of service attacks from keeping the whole
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network offline. Based on the use of blockchains in other applications and the needs
of a security system it is clear that a blockchain based approach to physical security
architectures could increase resiliency while still supporting the needs and goals of a
physical security system.
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Chapter 3

Methodology

Our background research has shown that our system could benefit from using a private permissioned blockchain it has also shown that our system meets the criteria
set up by Wüst and Gervais’ paper [12] for using a private permissioned blockchain.
we discussed the needs of a security system in terms of data communication and processing for analysis and how a blockchain implementation could support those needs.
With this information we can start to choose the correct blockchain implementation,
network structure, data processing, and sorting techniques.

In this section we will describe our process for deciding on a blockchain implementation for our test network, the network structure we used for our test network in
our chosen blockchain, how we processed the data that would be sent as transactions
on our blockchain network, how the data would be sorted for assessment, and lastly
we will describe how we took our original test network and changed it to test our
metrics from Chapter 4 at different sized networks to determine how performance in
those metrics scaled with respect to size.
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Selecting a Blockchain Implementation

We chose to build out a large model for this system using MultiChain 2.0. The process for choosing MultiChain as our basis for this project is detailed in this section.
In choosing a blockchain implementation with which one can build an application,
there are many options depending on system needs. As this work requires that
the blockchain not be viewed by the public we are limited to using private permissioned blockchains. This work limits itself to blockchains mature enough to build
upon as of implementation time in early 2019. We also decided against building
our own blockchain from scratch, to leverage the existing extensive testing done on
blockchains. of the features that was needed for this system was the ability to support
writing code to affect blockchain transactions.
These criteria limited the blockchains under consideration to private Ethereum
[18] and the Bitcoin core-based MultiChain [2]. Both of these blockchain implementations are private blockchains and allow one to write code through the use of smart
contracts and smart filters, respectively. While there are other blockchain implementations that meet the criteria we set forth at the original time of implementation
they were not sophisticated enough to build on.
Since MultiChain and Ethereum have similar capabilities (i.e. permissioned networks where privileged nodes allow new network connections, the ability to add code
to the blockchain, similar levels of maturity in early 2019) small test networks were
developed using both networks to determine which implementation would work best
for this use case. Diagrams of each network are shown in Figure 3.1.
The implementation of Ethereum used in this test, is the private version of Go
based Ethereum. Go Ethereum uses a proof of authority consensus algorithm [18].
Proof of Authority attaches a nodes reputation to their identity which incentivizes
nodes to uphold the transaction process to not be negatively impacted.
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Geth

Admin

Admin

Boot 2

Boot 1

Member

Member
Trusted Nodes

(a) Ethereum Network

Member

Member

Non-trusted Nodes

(b) MultiChain Network (Note all nodes
in this network are non-trusted)

Figure 3.1: Small Test Networks using Ethereum and MultiChain

The Ethereum Blockchain has four types of nodes that can be used geth, miner,
boot, and member.
• A geth node is the beginning node that sets up the blockchain with the genesis
block. This is where all of the parameters on the blockchain are described such
as the gas limit, the mining difficulty, and the nonce which is what is used to
distinguish this network as private. The nonce is a randomly generated hex
value so that an attacker would have difficulty guessing it to connect to the
network.
• A miner node is a node that can mine Ethereum for the network.
• A boot node is a node that is used to connect to the private network. This
adds decentralization to how nodes connect to the network as nodes do not
need to directly connect to the geth node and you can have any number of
boot nodes.
• A member node is node that is connected to the network and can send
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transactions.

The test setup used to determine if Ethereum should be used contained a geth
node, a miner node, two boot nodes, and two member nodes. This design assumes
that the geth and miner node are trusted since this design does not have multiple
geth nodes. The miner nodes must be trusted in this setup since the miner will be the
source of Ethereum so it needs to be trusted to distribute it in the correct manner.
This design was chosen because it takes advantage of the native protection of having
boot nodes while still being small enough to easily run tests on the implementation.
The testing setup is shown in Figure 3.1(a).
The MultiChain setup in Figure 3.1(b) starts with a single admin node and the
network can be added on by that admin. MultiChain uses a proof of work consensus
algorithm paired with a round robin schedule described in Section 2.2. MultiChain
has two types of nodes that can be used:
• A member node can validate, send, and receive transactions. They can also
mine if given permission from an admin node.
• An admin node has all the abilities of a member node well as other abilities,
like adding new nodes to the network.

The MultiChain network for this initial test is configured to have two admin nodes
and two member nodes, as seen in Figure 3.1(b). This design allows the network to
have enough nodes to turn some nodes off and still have the network be functional.
Unlike the Ethereum-based network, the MultiChain network does not assume that
any nodes are trusted because every node has other nodes which can perform its
functions.
In both networks, we test the functionality of the network by designing two
basic resiliency tests for our example networks. Both of these resiliency test are
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similar to two of our final testing metrics described in Chapter 4. One resiliency
test disconnected the connection node (boot node for Ethereum and admin node
for MultiChain) and attempted to connect a new node to the network. Our second
resiliency test used for these examples sent transactions to the both networks that
should not have been accepted based on the criteria setup using smart contracts on
Ethereum and smart filters on MultiChain and measured the propagation of this
transaction. Both networks passed these simple tests. Based on these tests and the
creation of both networks, we find that they both could perform the tasks required
of the network. However, after using both networks, we found that the private
Ethereum network has two drawbacks:
1. It requires more resources to maintain than the MultiChain network
2. It requires a more complex network structure
3. It is more difficult to set up than the MultiChain network which would affect
its acceptance by the physical security community
The system that we design requires ease of use and minimal addition of resources
due to the embedded nature. With these restrictions in mind, we decided to build
out our MultiChain network further.

3.2

Network

The notional network based on MultiChain is shown in Figure 3.2. Our larger test
network uses 13 virtual machines running Ubuntu 16.04 created using MultiChain
2.0 community edition [19]. This network was set up with a target block time of 15
seconds and a mining diversity requirement of 0.3, meaning that the spacing is 4 for
the 13 node network. With a spacing of 4 we know that a node A can mine a new
block after 3 blocks have been mined since the last block node A mined. With larger
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networks more blocks will need to be mined by others before node A would be able
to mine another block. With a higher mining diversity we could require more blocks
to be mined between sequential mines by a single block but with a higher mining
diversity the risk of the blockchain freezing up if nodes are inactive.

* Node 11

Node 12

Node 1

Node 10

Node 2 *

Node 9

Node 0

ImageNoClass
ImageClass
QRinvalid
QRvalid
Admin ImageNoClass
Admin ImageClass
Admin QRinvalid
Admin QRvalid

Node 3

Node 4

* Node 8
Node 7

Node 6

Node 5 *

Figure 3.2: Network Diagram for 13 nodes with two types of data input

The MultiChain network in Figure 3.2 has two types of nodes; admin nodes and
member nodes. The nodes are defined by what permissions they have. Member
nodes have permissions to send, validate, and receive transactions; admin nodes
have those permissions as well as the ability to create and approve smart filters and
add new nodes to the chain. These smart filters check if transactions meet certain
criteria before adding them to the block. Our network has two types of data input;
microwave sensors and security cameras. The MultiChain network for this project
was setup to have five admin nodes and eight member nodes. Nodes 0, 2, 5, 8, and
11 are admin nodes, nodes 3 and 4 are member nodes which add in imager data to
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the system, nodes 9 and 10 are member nodes which add in microwave data to the
system, and all other nodes are member nodes with no extra functionalities.
This network can be expanded upon either by adding more inputs for the current
types of data or by adding new types of data to be stored in the distributed ledger e.g.
one could add data about employee movements, movement of materials, or data from
other types of sensors. Adding either more types of data or more inputs would make
the system more complex, but could add more decentralization therefore requiring
more resources to shut the entire system down. These implications will be further
explored in Chapter 4.
This setup was designed to take advantage of having a decentralized architecture;
new nodes (both admin and member) can still connect to the network and new smart
filters can still be approved as long as some subset of admin node(s) are present.
MultiChain has the advantage that no nodes in the system need to be trusted for
the network to continue operations. If necessary an admin node can also create a
new blockchain and allow known uncompromised nodes onto the new blockchain if
too many nodes are compromised in a system.
As we will demonstrate in Chapter 5, if an admin node is taken over, the other
admin or admins can start a stream or even a new chain with the non-compromised
nodes. This means that it would be difficult to perform an attack on this system
by shutting off nodes without spending a large amount of resources. Similarly if an
adversary only shut off a few member nodes the system would remain able to send
transactions.
With this network structure we are able to prioritize data that comes onto the
network by placing data that has detections on the image class chain and the microwave detect chain. This supports the goal of flexibility for our security system
by making multiple types of data easily accessible. By setting our target time to 15
seconds and our mining diversity to 0.3 we support fast agreement by adding new
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blocks quickly while maintaining security against one node taking over the entire
network. This network structure also changes how we trust the components in our
system compared to a centralized security system showing that in multiple areas this
network design supports the needs and goals of a future physical security system.

3.3

Data Processing

Two types of sensing devices were used in this analysis: cameras and microwaves.
Each camera sensor takes images of the object related to the microwave sensor and
processes them using the You Only Look Once (YOLO) object detection algorithm to
detect classes of interest (e.g., people, vehicles, etc.). YOLO is a convolution neural
network object detector that applies a simple neural network to the whole image and
then divides the image in to regions to predict where bounding boxes should go in
those regions.
YOLO was chosen because with this technique the image only needs to go through
the neural network once and so it can process images in real time while providing
regional data for where a target(s) are located within a scene associated with the
image file [20]. If no target is located, the image file is not associated with a class
giving us the ability to sort image data based on that factor.
Microwaves are sensors which use switch closures to indicate that an object has
passed through their line of detection. When an object is detected the microwave will
have a low value and when it is in a secure state the value will be high. We use this
value to determine which chain to place a transaction in the microwave sub-network.
If YOLO detects an object in the scene or a microwave shows a low value for
a detection the transactions from that event will be added to the image class and
microwave detect chains. Otherwise the transactions will be placed on the microwave
and no image class chain. The process for how this is done will be covered in section
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3.4.
One of the reasons for utilizing blockchain technology to distribute the data in
a security system to multiple locations is to support the use of secure distributed
computing where multiple nodes can communicate and run algorithms to come to
decisions about data passed through the system and come to agreement (consensus)
on the decision between the nodes. Possible applications of this idea will be further
explored in Chapter 6.1.

3.4

Data Sorting
ImageClass

Transcam

Smart Filter

ImageNoClass

OffChain

(a) Camera Sorter

MicrowaveDetect

TransMW

Smart Filter

MicrowaveNoDetect

OffChain

(b) Microwave Sorter

Figure 3.3: Diagram of how data is sorted in the system

Figure 3.3 shows how the data from the sensors is sorted in this network using smart
filters. A smart filter in MultiChain is code that is added to the chain by a single
admin node and approved by the admin nodes collectively. This code affects which
transactions will be accepted on a particular chain by evaluating the amount of a
token in a transaction or the metadata sent with the transaction. The implementation of smart filters in our system allows the data to be sorted to the appropriate
channels depending on both the token in the transaction and the metadata that is
sent with the transaction in the form of a JSON object. The smart filters also allow the system to ignore data that has been tampered with instead of letting large
amounts of faulty data propagate through the system. One of the smart filters in
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this system is described in Section 3.4.2, and an example of a transaction is given in
Section 3.4.1.

3.4.1

Transactions

The transaction in listing 3.1 is sent to both blockchains in the camera sub-network.
The only difference between the transactions on the two networks will be the address
they are sent to as one will be sent to an address on the imageClass chain and one
will be sent to an address on the imageNoClass chain. For this example the address is
1WfiQNZirYMwVqVgdKvaboupEpz3FWHzcAEzec. This transaction contains an image
with an object detected in it and the related percentage of confidence and regional
information outputted from YOLO. The transaction contains two assets which is
what a smart filter is attached to when it is added to the blockchain (i.e. you must
have any required assets in a transaction for it to not be rejected).
1 sendwithdata 1 W f i Q N Z i r Y M w V q V g d K v a b o u p E p z 3 F W H z c A E z e c
2 ’ {" tamperAsset ":10 , " classifyAsset ":1} ’
3 ’ {" json ":
4

{

5

" filename ":"/ media /210/ image1 . png " ,

6

" classify ":" person " ,

7

" percent ":0.5402294993400574 ,

8

" center x ":1024.7264404296875 ,

9

" center y ":180.95614624023438 ,

10

" width ":16.506134033203125 ,

11

" height " : 3 3. 7 9 19 3 8 78 1 7 38 2 8

12

}

13 } ’

Listing 3.1: Transaction for camera with object detected
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The assets being sent for this transaction are:

• the tamper asset which represents the value of whether the system has been
tampered with or not. A tamper in this situation describes a physical tamper
on a sensor. When a sensor is tampered with, a switch will change the value
being sent to the network. A transaction that has not been tampered with will
have a value of 10. If a transaction has been tampered with the value would
be outside of 10.

• the classify asset is the asset that transactions with images must be sent with
which is also why only one unit of the asset is sent with the transaction. This
allows the system to determine if the transaction could meet the requirements
of all smart filters on the blockchain. The smart filter on this chain related to
classify asset is the classify filter described in Section 3.2.

The data passed through in this transaction is represented by a JSON object.
This contains a link to the image (stored in a video management system) being
passed as well as the classification made by YOLO along with the percentage of
certainty and location values. This is useful information for a human operator to
have as it will allow them to find objects in the image being referenced more easily
making for a quicker assessment of the data. This transaction will be added to the
ImageClass sub-network because the JSON object contains a value for classification;
if it did not it would be sent to the ImageNoClass chain. JSON objects are an easy
way to send multiple types of data making them ideal for large complex systems like
the one described in this paper; examples of a JSON object being used for other
types of data is shown in Appendix A.
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Smart Filters

Each transaction is added to a specific blockchain based on the code written in
the smart filters for that chain. Each smart filter affects transactions made on the
blockchain that has the smart filter approved. A transaction can be sent to multiple
blockchains which will sort the data accordingly. An example of a smart filter is
shown below; all other smart filters for this system are in Appendix B.
1 classifyFilter function fi ltertr ansact ion ()
2 {
3

var meta = g e t f i l t e r t r a n s a c t i o n () ;

4

s = String ( meta . vout [1]. data [0]. json . classify ) ;

5

if ( s . valueOf () == " " . valueOf () )

6

{

7

return " Classify not found "

8

}

9 }

Listing 3.2: Smart filter to determine if an object is in an image

The Smart Filter in listing 3.2 checks to see if there is an object detected in an image.
This code is written in JavaScript and checks that the classify value in the JSON
object of the transaction contains a value from YOLO. This filter is placed on the
Image Class sub-network. If the transaction fails this code check, the image will not
be added to the Image Class chain and will need to go through another smart filter
to be added on a different sub-network matching the data type and detection status.
With the smart filters and transactions set up the network ran with data being
placed on the chain correctly and securely supporting the goal of fast agreement
and flexibility for the security system. This shows that the network can support
thousands of transactions being placed on it at a rate that is fast enough that humans
in the loop wouldn’t be able to detect the difference in the time it takes for the data
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(b) 26 node

(c) 39 node

Figure 3.4: Graph representations of other networks used for scaling analysis

to be uploaded. This will be shown in Chapter 5. Therefore it will be valuable to
make some initial measurements of the system for quantitative analysis. Doing so
will allow us to determine if there are actually added security measures from the use
of blockchain in the system.

3.5

Scalable System Design

Our small test structure can be used to perform some analysis but it is important
to note that a blockchain’s performance could change as the network size grows or
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shrinks. To test how the network scales we created different test structures utilizing
VMWare. With VMWare we tested 3 other network sizes 7 nodes, 26 nodes, and 39
nodes shown in Figure 3.4.
The networks that we tested were similar to our test network but expanded or
reduced the number of nodes. For instance, our 7 node network had 3 admin nodes,
our 26 node network had 10 and our 39 node network had 15 while our original sized
network had 5 admin nodes. These test networks were still tested with microwave
and camera data. The smart filters utilized on our original network structure were
also used on these networks to sort data according to the criteria described in Section
3.4
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Chapter 4
Security Metrics

This system utilizes the MultiChain network framework which contains admin nodes
as well as member nodes. These nodes were connected together based on the framework described in Section 3.2. This framework allowed the system to communicate
data effectively and securely. It is important to have quantitative analysis for new
distributed network architectures so that there can be proof that the system will work
under specific conditions. This ensures that the system will perform as we expect
it to during the worst circumstances. To make preliminary steps toward providing
quantitative measurements for a blockchain-based data sharing network, we perform
four tests on the system described above.
Admin Resiliency Test: We take down different combinations of admin nodes
and measure whether new nodes can connect to the network. Admin nodes provide
a multitude of important features for the system; admins control connection to the
network, the control of the creation of code, the approval of code, and the permissions
of each node in the system. If taking an admin node offline could take away any of
these features, then the network would be susceptible to a simple attack. Being able
to successfully run with fewer admins increases the robustness of the system. We
perform this test by shutting down the virtual machines that host the admin nodes
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for each sub-network. This simulates the plug being pulled which would turn the
node off and disconnect it from the network architecture. We test this for all admin
nodes, including turning all admins off.
Member Resiliency Test: We take down different combinations of member
nodes and measure whether transactions can still be sent through the system. This
test was important to show that a partial outage of the system would not remove
vital capabilities from the entire system. For example if one half of the system shown
in Figure 3.2 were to be taken off, the consequences for the other half of the network
should be kept to a minimum. We test this by taking down a node one at a time and
checking each time that the system continues to add transactions to the blockchain.
Tamper Detection Test: We detect tampering of the physical system by evaluating each transaction for a tamper value. These values can come from any node on
any transaction. The tests involve sending a transaction with a tamper from admin
nodes and member nodes. Rather than simply turning a node off, some threats can
merely change a node’s camera’s direction or change how the sensor communicates
the data to the network. We perform this test by changing the tamper values for the
transactions to represent the change in value from the sensor.
Bandwidth Comparison Test: We measure the time it takes to send a multitude of data points to both the blockchain network and a basic SQL database. The
database is set up on the same architecture as the blockchain network (Ubuntu 16.04
Virtual Machine). The tests involve using data sets from the same source, changing the data to follow the format that is required by MySQL for the database, and
the JSON objects for the blockchain network. The data sets are sent through both
the network and the database and they are timed using the time function from the
kernel.
Speed of Transaction Test: We measure the average time it takes to send a
single transaction on the blockchain network. We perform this test by measuring the
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real time from the bash time command for a single transaction. This was measured
multiple times to collect an average.
Scalability: We measure how each of the above tests scale with respect to size.
The current sizes we have tested are 7 nodes, 13 nodes, 26 nodes and 39 nodes.
We are limited in the sizes that we can test by the technology used for our current
simulation so the upperbound of nodes we can test is 39. For the scalability test we
run each test at these different network sizes to determine how the metrics change
when the size of the network changes.
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Chapter 5
Results

The results from the five security metrics and scalability analysis described in Chapter 4 will be analyzed in this chapter. In this chapter we will cover the results of
the admin resiliency test, member resiliency test, bandwidth comparison test, speed
of transaction test, and will discuss with each of those test how they performed at
different sizes of networks. In each of these test we will see that there is an increase
in resiliency and an increase in transaction speed. After performing five metric tests
in a variety of different contexts (Table 5.1, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5) we are able to see a path
forward for scaling this to a full scale system.

5.1

Admin Resiliency Test

The admin resiliency test shows that the network would continue to allow new regular
and admin nodes to be created as well as the creation of new smart filters and the
approval and falsification of older smart filters. As we can see in Table 5.1, this is
true for each sub-network when any one admin node was taken down in the network
and true for the whole network when up to four of the five admin nodes were taken
down (depending on which set of nodes were taken down simultaneously). In a larger
system, more admin nodes would be able to be taken down since the system would
be distributed across more actors that could maintain functionality.
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Test
Admin

Member

Tamper

# of
# of
# of
Can
Can Send
Attempts Admins Members Connect Transactions
5
5
7
3
5
4
7
3
5
3
7
3
5
2
7
3
–
5
1
7
3
5
0
7
7
30
5
7
3
30
5
6
3
30
5
5
3
30
5
4
3
30
5
3
3
30
5
2
3
30
5
1
3
30
5
0
3
30
4
0
some
30
3
0
some
30
2
0
some
30
1
0
7
50
5
7
-
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Tamper
Detected
3

Table 5.1: Results from testing admin and member resiliency test and tamper test for
the 13 node network. First column describes which test is performed, second column
described the number of attempts made at this number of nodes, the 3rd column
shows how many admin nodes and the fourth column shows how many member
nodes.

5.2

Member Resiliency Test

The member resiliency test shows that taking regular nodes offline still yields a network that is able to support the transactions required for the system to communicate
data. We find that as long as two nodes in the sub network remained on, the network
could still communicate the data as expected. This is important because if only one
node needed to be taken down to cut communication, then the failure of a single
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sensor would compromise the operation of the entire network – an obvious failure for
a secure system. Similarly, in a larger system, more nodes could be taken offline and
this functionality would still work because there is more decentralization and simply
more nodes to take offline in general.

5.3

Tamper Detection Test

The goal of the tamper detection test is to evaluate if the system could detect a
tamper in the physical space. When a device is physically tampered with it will send
a signal that it has been opened. This signal is represented in the system as the
tamper asset. Code was written in this architecture to detect a change in this value
from the expected value of 10 seen in Appendix B. If there is a change in the tamper
asset for a transaction that transaction will be ignored by the system to prevent
misinformation from making its way to a human for assessment.
This test revealed that the transactions could correctly identify tampering and
ignore the data being sent. This simulated tamper assessment is similar to a real life
tamper but would need to be tested further on a physical test bed to confirm the
results given by the simulation.

5.4

Bandwidth Comparison Test

This test was setup by running thousands of transactions through the blockchain and
the centralized database at different bandwidths and seeing how long the blockchain
and centralized database took to store all of the data. The goal of the bandwidth
comparison test results shown in Figure 5.1 is to evaluate if a blockchain decreases
the speed of data flow enough for a human in the loop to notice, this is additionally
compared to a database as a baseline example. We can see from the table that using
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the blockchain does slow the speed of data flow compared to the database it is shown
that it the blockchain implementation is fast enough for human participants to receive
multiple transactions per second which means there will be no noticeable difference
for the human in the loop while having the added security from a decentralized
immutable data log.
500

Database
Blockchain

400

300

Time
sec
200

100

0

10 mb/s

45 mb/s

Bandwidth

100 mb/s

Figure 5.1: Average time to send transactions on database and blockchain at different
bandwidths

5.5

Speed of Transaction Test

The goal of the speed of transaction test with results shown in Figure 5.2 is to
evaluate how long it takes to send a single transaction in the network. This was
measured by sending 17000 transactions through each size of network multiple times
and averaging the amount of time spent sending the transactions and then diving
by 17000 to get the average time spent to send a single transaction at each size.
The raw data used to create the scatter plot is show in Table 5.2. With our small
scalability analysis we see that transaction speed increases following the equation:

y = 0.0171x0.3802

(5.1)
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Figure 5.2: Scatter plot showing the real time elapsed as the network grows in size
from 7 nodes to 39 nodes.

Run 1
Run 2
Run 3
Run 4
Run 5
Average

BC1 (s) BC2 (s)
632.13
706.042
649.288 737.197
623.998 758.053
554.13
758.514
529.01
745.694
597.7112
741.3

BC3 (s)
BC4
917.088 1152.169
307.91
1195.943
930.932 1251.579
947.784 1318.189
989.079 1349.259
943.1676 1253.4278

Table 5.2: Raw data from the real time speed test. .

5.6

Scaling for Resiliency Tests

Along with evaluating the transaction speed at different sizes of networks the admin,
member and tamper test were also evaluated at different sized networks. The results
from this testing are shown in multiple tables. Table 5.3 shows the results from both
the admin and member resiliency test on the 7 node network. Table 5.4 shows the
results of the admin resiliency test in the 26 node network. Table 5.5 shows the
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results from the member resiliency test in the 26 node network. Table C.1 shows the
results from the admin resiliency test in a 39 node network, and Table C.2 shows the
member resiliency test results from the 39 node network.
Test
Admin

Member

Tamper

# of
# of
# of
Can
Can Send
Attempts Admins Members Connect Transactions
5
3
4
3
5
2
4
3
–
5
1
4
3
5
0
4
7
30
3
4
3
30
3
3
3
30
3
2
3
30
3
1
3
30
3
0
3
30
2
0
some
30
1
0
7
50
3
4
-

Tamper
Detected
3

Table 5.3: Results from testing admin and member resiliency test and tamper test
for the 7 node network.

Each of these tests showed that the resilience to node failure both member and
admin increases as the network size grows. In Table 5.3 we see that there is only
one condition where a network is able to send some transactions. This is because
since the size is much smaller there is not space on this network to send more than
2 types of transactions with our design. This network performed similarly to the
original network size in the admin resiliency test but since there are fewer admin
nodes on this network it will take less effort to take down all the admin networks
than in larger networks with more admin nodes.
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the results from the admin resiliency test, tamper test
and member resiliency test. From these tables we see that in comparison to our 13
node network more admin nodes and member nodes can be taken offline. Since this
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# of
# of
# of
Can
Tamper
Attempts Admins Members Connect Detected
5
10
16
3
5
9
16
3
5
8
16
3
5
7
16
3
5
6
16
3
5
5
16
3
5
4
16
3
5
3
16
3
5
2
16
3
5
1
16
3
5
0
16
7
-

Table 5.4: Results from testing admin resiliency test and tamper test for the 26 node
network.

network has the same number of sub-networks as our 13 node networks the window
where some transactions can be sent through the network is the same as the 13 node
network but more nodes must be taken offline before reaching that point in this 26
node network. With 39 nodes in the network you see similar resiliency increases
with an increase in nodes both member and admin that must be taken down before
performance issues arise in the system. The tables for the 39 node admin resiliency,
member resiliency and tamper test are in Appendix C

Chapter 5. Results
Test
Member

39
# of
# of
# of
Can Send
Attempts Admins Members Transactions
30
10
16
3
30
10
15
3
30
10
14
3
30
10
13
3
30
10
12
3
30
10
11
3
30
10
10
3
30
10
9
3
30
10
8
3
30
10
7
3
30
10
6
3
30
10
5
3
30
10
4
3
30
10
3
3
30
10
2
3
30
10
1
3
30
10
0
3
30
9
0
3
30
8
0
3
30
7
0
3
30
6
0
3
30
5
0
3
30
4
0
some
30
3
0
some
30
2
0
some
30
1
0
7

Table 5.5: Results from testing member resiliency test for the 26 node network.

5.7

Results Discussion

Overall the results from this work indicate that a blockchain-based communication
network would be a reasonable step forward for a distributed data communication
network in a security system. It brings many important advancements such as de-
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centralization and immutable data ledgers to this test system. From our results we
see that as the system becomes larger there are increases in resiliency to node failure both admin and member, tampers are still detected.We have also found that in
our particular system as more nodes are added it takes longer to send transactions,
at current sizes transactions are still sent fast enough that a human observing the
blockchain would likely not notice a slow down in real time.
There are many things that can be tested in the future of this project. Including
looking at how the network performs at larger sizes, more resiliency metrics including tests on the absorptive, adaptive and restorative capacity, and testing these
metrics with different blockchain implementations. These tests are discussed further
in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
Our work developed a blockchain-based approach to secure and promulgate data
from a physical security system. Simulations performed in this work indicate the
feasibility of this approach. After performing three tests on the network, we are able
to verify that this architecture behaves similarly to public permissionless blockchains
like Bitcoin. The results discussed above show that this type of network has promise
to be a future communication network for a new physical security architecture.
We have shown that our network is resistant to power failures and attacks which
take down parts of the system, as one would need to take down many nodes to shut
off communication to the human operator. The results from the admin resiliency
test show promise for the network being able to adapt to an attack, as an admin
node can add new nodes and change code such that an attacker may not be able to
maintain control of enough of the network to perform an attack. The tamper test
showed that the system was able to correctly detect when a tamper was occurring
and disregard the data being sent as it might be false. This will allow a human to
assess the components of the system which has been tampered with before adding
that information back into the network.
Our bandwidth comparison test differentiated between the MultiChain based
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blockchain speed with that of a centralized database. While this showed that a
centralized database was indeed faster at processing transactions over each bandwidth constraint it also showed that a blockchain can still process transactions fast
enough that that a human operator would not notice. The related test to measure
transaction speed showed that transactions can be sent at under a second for all network sizes tested. When testing these metrics at different network sizes the results
show that as network size increases so does resilience, but transactions take longer
to propagate across the network.
Lastly throughout this paper we have described how a blockchain implementation
for decentralized data communication could support the needs of a security system.
We found that a blockchain supports three main needs of physical security systems
(i.e. fast agreement, tamper resistant, and flexibility). In our design these are
supported by a 15 second target for block creation, the immutable ledger common
in blockchain technology, and our network design utilizing multiple assets to handle
different types of data and present the most important data in few locations.

6.1

Future Work

There are many avenues to expand on this work, all of which would be valuable to
proving that blockchain can be used as a data sharing platform between large scale
entities. First, it would be useful to build a physical test bed to more accurately
test the physical threats to the system such as tampering. This would demonstrate
that the network functions outside of the digital space and can truly meet the needs
of a physical security system. Second, testing different types of private blockchain
implementation such as private Ethereum[18], Hyperledger fabric [21], R3 Corda[22],
Polkadot[8], and others to determine if these results hold true across multiple types of
blockchain implementations or if there is added benefits from other implementations
that have not been seen in MultiChain to this point.

Chapter 6. Conclusion and Future Work

43

There are several other hypothesized benefits of the proposed system. These
benefits include that it will be hard to destroy or change historical data in the
network so that when an audit occurs, accurate data is represented and so that
if an insider tries to attack the system, data will be recorded accurately without
being changed by said insider. A final benefit that this network structure appears
to provide is that entities no longer need to rely on trust of the components and of
each other. This will allow the system to be secure and resilient because components
could break or fault and it would not affect the system as a whole. These could all
be tested using a physical test bed in future work.
While we have shown in Section 3.1 that in a very small case that MultiChain
appeared to be a more optimal framework than private Ethereum, there has been
a vast expansion close to publication time of the variety as well as the quality of
blockchain-based frameworks. A third avenue for more extensive testing is evaluating
MultiChain and other blockchain networks at larger scales. While at the small scales
we tested at we saw that we gained resilience without sacrificing much speed its
possible that at larger sizes we could see something different.
A final avenue to expand on is testing more resiliency metrics. While this work
shows that it would be feasible to use blockchain as the communication network of
the system, it is important to take a solid quantitative approach when making a
new data sharing platform. The current metrics in preliminary testing are focused
heavily on how a blockchain would operate in the architecture. The metrics that
will be created should focus on creating a system with absorptive, adaptive, and
recoverable capacity [23]. If these metrics can be met by the system, then the
network architecture will prove suitable to be deployed as a communication network
for a physical security system.
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Appendix A
Transactions
1 sendwithdata 1 F d q T N 7 c 8 X X k S b h 9 s 2 6 2 k K y L R M N Z H g z 9 2 s v N Y L
2 ’ {" tamperAsset ":10 ," detectAsset ":10} ’
3 ’ {" json ":
4

{

5

" Microwave ":"5"

6

}

7 }’

Listing A.1: Transaction to show microwave in alarm state

The transaction in listing A.1 is a microwave transaction that shows a microwave in
an alarm state. This transaction is valid because the tamper value in the system was
set to 10. This means that it will be added to the Microwave Detect chain.
1 sendwithdata 1 F d q T N 7 c 8 X X k S b h 9 s 2 6 2 k K y L R M N Z H g z 9 2 s v N Y L
2 ’ {" tamperAsset ":10 ," detectAsset ":10} ’
3 ’ {" json ":
4

{

5
6

" Microwave ":"10"
}
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7 }’

Listing A.2: Transaction to show microwave in secure state
The transaction in listing A.2 is similar to the one above, the only difference is that
this transaction has a microwave in a secure state so it will be added to the Microwave
No Detect chain.
1 sendwithdata 1 W f i Q N Z i r Y M w V q V g d K v a b o u p E p z 3 F W H z c A E z e c
2 ’ {" tamperAsset ":10 , " classifyAsset ":10} ’
3 ’ {" json ":
4

{

5

" filename ":"/ media /210/ image1 . png " ,

6

" classify ":"" , " percent ":0

7

}

8 }’

Listing A.3: Transaction for camera with no object detected
The transaction in listing A.3 is a camera transaction that shows an image from a
video feed which has not detected a target. This transaction is valid because the
tamper value in the system was set to 10. This means it will be added to the Image
No Class chain.
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Appendix B
Smart Filters
1 No Classify Filter function fi ltertr ansact ion ()
2 {
3

var meta = g e t f i l t e r t r a n s a c t i o n () ;

4

s = String ( meta . vout [1]. data [0]. json . classify ) ;

5

if ( s . valueOf () != " " . valueOf () )

6

{

7

return " Classify found "

8

}

9 }

This is a smart filter that checks if there is no object detected in an image. This filter
is run on the Image No Class chain. If a transaction fails this check, the transaction
will not be added to the Image No Class chain and will need to go to another chain
to check if the transaction follows the rules set by that chain.
1 Tamper Filter function fi ltertr ansact ion ()
2 {
3

var meta = g e t f i l t e r t r a n s a c t i o n () ;

4

s = String ( meta . vout [0]. assets [0]. qty ) ;

5

if ( s . valueOf () != " 10 " . valueOf () )
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{

7

return " Tamper Detected "

8

}

9 }

This is a smart filter detects tampering in the system by checking the value of
a tamper asset and comparing it against a predetermined value. This value can be
changed periodically to make sure that an attacker does not have time to test the
system enough to figure it out. This smart filter is placed on every chain to detect
tampering on all sensors in the system.
1 MicrowaveDetect Filter function filte rtrans action ()
2 {
3

varmeta = g e t f i l t e r t r a n s a c t i o n () ;

4

s = String ( meta . vout [1]. data [0]. json . Microwave ) ;

5

if ( s . valueOf () != " 5 " . valueOf () )

6

{

7

return " No intrusion found "

8

}

9 }

This smart filter checks to see if the data sent by the microwave indicates there was
an intrusion. If a transaction fails this check it will not be added to the Microwave
Detect chain and will need to be sent on another chain to check if the transaction
follows the rules set by that chain.
1 Microwave Filter function filte rtrans action ()
2 {
3

var meta = g e t f i l t e r t r a n s a c t i o n () ;

4

s = String ( meta . vout [1]. data [0]. json . Microwave ) ;

5

if ( s . valueOf () != " 10 " . valueOf () )

6

{
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9 }

return " Intrusion found "
}
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Appendix C
39 Node Network Results

Test
Admin

# of
# of
# of
Can
Tamper
Attempts Admins Members Connect Detected
5
15
24
3
5
14
24
3
5
13
24
3
5
12
24
3
5
11
24
3
5
10
24
3
5
9
24
3
5
8
24
3
5
7
24
3
5
6
24
3
5
5
24
3
5
4
24
3
5
3
24
3
5
2
24
3
5
1
24
3
5
0
24
7
-

Table C.1: Results from testing admin resiliency test and tamper test for the 39 node
network.
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Test
Member

# of
# of
Attempts Admins
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
1
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
15
30
14
30
13
30
12
30
11
30
10
30
9
30
8
30
7
30
6
30
5
30
4
30
3
30
2
30
1

51
# of
Can Send
Members Transactions
24
3
23
3
22
3
21
3
20
3
19
3
18
3
17
3
16
3
15
3
14
3
13
3
12
3
11
3
10
3
9
3
8
3
7
3
6
3
5
3
4
3
3
3
2
3
1
3
0
3
0
3
0
3
0
3
0
3
0
3
0
3
0
3
0
3
0
3
0
3
0
some
0
some
0
some
0
7

Table C.2: Results from testing member resiliency test for the 39 node network.
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[12] K. Wüst and A. Gervais, “Do you need a blockchain?” in 2018 Crypto Valley
Conference on Blockchain Technology (CVCBT). IEEE, 2018, pp. 45–54.
[13] A. Azaria, A. Ekblaw, T. Vieira, and A. Lippman, “Medrec: Using blockchain
for medical data access and permission management,” in 2016 2nd International
Conference on Open and Big Data (OBD). IEEE, 2016, pp. 25–30.
[14] J. J. Sikorski, J. Haughton, and M. Kraft, “Blockchain technology in the chemical industry: Machine-to-machine electricity market,” Applied Energy, vol. 195,
pp. 234–246, 2017.
[15] V. Zakhary, M. J. Amiri, S. Maiyya, D. Agrawal, and A. E. Abbadi, “Towards
global asset management in blockchain systems,” BCDL: First Workshop on
Blockchain and Distributed Ledger, 2019.
[16] G. Zyskind, O. Nathan et al., “Decentralizing privacy: Using blockchain to
protect personal data,” in 2015 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops. IEEE,
2015, pp. 180–184.
[17] E. Karafiloski and A. Mishev, “Blockchain solutions for big data challenges: A
literature review,” in IEEE EUROCON 2017-17th International Conference on
Smart Technologies. IEEE, 2017, pp. 763–768.
[18] J.
Wilcke
and
F.
Lange,
“Go-ethereum
private
network,”
https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/wiki/Private-network, 2017.
[19] Greenspan, “Creating and connecting to a blockchain.” [Online]. Available:
https://www.multichain.com/developers/creating-connecting/
[20] J. Redmon, S. Divvala, R. Girshick, and A. Farhadi, “You only look once:
Unified, real-time object detection,” in Proceedings of the IEEE conference on
computer vision and pattern recognition, 2016, pp. 779–788.
[21] E. Androulaki, A. Barger, V. Bortnikov, C. Cachin, K. Christidis, A. De Caro,
D. Enyeart, C. Ferris, G. Laventman, Y. Manevich et al., “Hyperledger fabric:
a distributed operating system for permissioned blockchains,” in Proceedings of
the Thirteenth EuroSys Conference. ACM, 2018, p. 30.
[22] R. G. Brown, J. Carlyle, I. Grigg, and M. Hearn, “Corda: an introduction,” R3
CEV, August, vol. 1, p. 15, 2016.
[23] R. Francis and B. Bekera, “A metric and frameworks for resilience analysis
of engineered and infrastructure systems,” Reliability Engineering & System
Safety, vol. 121, pp. 90–103, 2014.

